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AUTOMATING PERIODIC ROLE-CHECKS
A TOOL-BASED APPROACH
Ludwig Fuchs, Christian Müller1

Abstract
The use of roles in Identity Management has proven to be a solution for reorganising and securing
the access structures of organisations. One critical challenge companies face after they
implemented roles is the maintenance of the role system itself. This includes sophisticated duties
like periodically verifying the valid roles. We argue that due to the high complexity, periodic rolechecks need to be automated. However, as a result of lacking theoretical foundation, no
approaches to leverage the level automation have been published so far. In this work we develop a
catalogue of use cases that affect the role definitions within an organisation. We propose
checkROLE, a tool for automated role-checking on basis of the defined use case catalogue.

1. Motivation
In today’s business environment companies provide access to resources to a greater number of
users, and more types of users, than ever before. Major IT security problems arise because of
employees gaining unauthorised access to resources as a result of manually handling user accounts
([4], [12]). This situation results in the so called identity chaos. National and international
regulations like Basel II [1], the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [19], and the EU Directive 95/46 [5] force
businesses to audit the actions within their systems. In-house Identity Management (IdM) is a
means to solve the aforementioned identity chaos. It deals with the storage, administration, and
usage of digital identities during their lifecycle [8]. Role-based IdM in particular is seen as a means
to get compliant in general and to easily manage identities and their access to resources ([6], [10]).
However, the central challenge after the implementation of roles is the management and
maintenance of the role system itself in order to assure its timeliness. This includes the operative
administration of the user-role assignments as well as strategic tasks including, e.g., the
administration of role-permission assignments. Several developments within an organisation might
affect the role definitions and require the role catalogue to be adapted. With thousands of users and
millions of authorisations in big companies this task can’t efficiently be carried out manually.
Besides the lacking theoretical foundation, no approaches to leverage the level of automation
during the process of role-checking have been published so far. In this work we develop a catalogue
of use cases that affect the role catalogue within an organisation. In order to show the applicability
and advantages of our approach we furthermore propose checkROLE, a tool for the automatic
1
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detection of the defined use cases. Using checkROLE organisations can automatically identify
changes in their role definitions and keep their role catalogue up-to-date.
This paper is structured as follows. After an introduction to Role System Management and periodic
role-checks in the related work section, we introduce a catalogue of use cases as the theoretical
foundation for automating role-checks in section 3. After a detailed description we analyse selected
use cases showing their influence on role definitions. In section 4 we then consecutively propose
checkROLE. Section 5 gives conclusions and points out future work.

2. Related Work
2.1. Role System Management
Operative and strategic management of roles and the role system in general are essential tasks to
keep the implemented role definitions usable. In order to avoid misunderstandings we define the
terms used in the following: Role System Management is the umbrella term for operative Role
Management and strategic Role Management (Role Maintenance). Operative Role Management
includes routine administration duties like user-role-assignment or role-permission-assignment
according to the given administration model. Various authors investigated this area proposing
several role administration publications like [2], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], and [21] as well as role
system lifecycles ([9], [11], [20]). However, operative Role Management can only be carried out
effectively on basis of correct role definitions. Besides the maintenance of the underlying role
concept and -model, the most important Role Maintenance duty is the up-to-date keeping of the role
catalogue on basis of strategic Role Management processes. In contrast to its operative counterpart,
this task heavily depends on organisational and operational structures (OOS) within a company.
With dozens of business processes, thousands of users and millions of authorisations in big
organisations, strategic Role Management is a seemingly difficult task. Only a few authors
theoretically touched this issue on the brink ([11], [20]) while hardly any of them consider
automation of Role Maintenance processes. The goal is to face Role Maintenance challenges by
analysing existing role- and permission structures in order to provide suggestions for necessary
changes in the role definitions, role-permission-, and user-role assignments. This way inconsistent
permission assignments endangering compliance with security principles can be cleansed.
2.2. Periodic Role-Checks
The importance of periodic role-checks as central part of the Role Maintenance duties has recently
been pointed out by [9]. The goal of periodic role-checks is to evaluate the elements of a role system
at a certain point of time in order to identify changes within a company that affect the role
definitions. Values of role model elements of the last valid state are compared with their actual
values in the productive systems. Periodic role-checks have to rely on existing user and access
information as well as role definitions stored in the Identity Management Infrastructure or other
user repositories. Together with organisational structures and the basic employee information
coming from various directories this is a reliable and permanently available source for adequate
user information. After the input information has been gathered the comparison of the output OP(t)
of the productive user management environment at time t against the last valid role catalogue state
OR(t-1) on basis of predefined use cases indicates events that affect the role definitions (see Figure
1). A consecutive impact analysis provides further assistance for resolving the discrepancies.
Modifications in the organisational structure and user population are highlighted, for example when
employees move to another department or a large number of new employees are hired. On basis of
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this assistance a decision for resolving the open issues has to be made manually in an analytical
way together with business- and IT representatives. In general, one can say that this duty is an
iterative process, reducing inconsistencies all along the overall role-check process loop. As seen in
Figure 1, periodic role-checks need to be carried out on basis of a well-defined use case catalogue.
To the best of our knowledge no such basis has been proposed yet and no insight about underlying
use cases as well as practical implementation issues is given in literature. In the following we close
this gap by developing a use case catalogue that can be used as theoretical basis for role-checks.

.
Figure 1: Role-checking on basis of a given use case catalogue

3. Automatic Role-Checking
3.1. Input Elements
Before designing a comprehensive use case catalogue we identified the various elements within
organisations affecting role-checks and the defined role catalogue using busiROLE [7] as
underlying role model. BusiROLE supports the usage of various types of roles, namely Basic
Roles, Organisational Roles, and Functional Roles and is applicable in complex role environments.
Basic Roles bundle common access rights, Organisational Roles represent employees' positions,
and Functional Roles correspond to the task bundles of employees. Basic Roles can be regarded as
special Organisational Roles. Our research was carried out on basis of practical experience with
various partners from industry on the one hand and scientific publications in the business
administration- and role-based user management area ([3], [11], [13], and [20]) on the other hand. The
initial analysis revealed a number of components influencing the valid set of roles (see tables 1-6):
Employees, Organisational Hierarchies, Positions, Task Bundles, and Permission (Bundles).
Employees e.g. could leave the company or be assigned to a different hierarchical element. A
hierarchical element is defined as a unit in the organisational structure of an enterprise, for example
a business unit, a department, or a unit within a department. In other cases employees might be
promoted and assigned to a new Position and new Task Bundles. Examples for change of
Organisational Hierarchies include mergers or major restructuring efforts within a business area.
Additionally, Permission Bundles of users might change over time. New IT systems might be
implemented and the respective rights assigned to the employees while old system might no longer
be used. Various constraints, e.g. security policies restricting the user-role- and user-permissionassignments can also affect Role Maintenance. However those constraints are usually not stored in
a way that they could automatically be integrated into the role-checking process. Hence we focus
on the previously introduced elements because information about those elements is likely to be
available in an appropriate format. A definition of every element is given in the following to found
the basis of standardised use case catalogue description in section 3.2.
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Tables 1-6: Definition of input elements for role-checks

Employees
EMPS
EMPa∈ EMPS

A set of all employees
A human being working for a certain enterprise

Organisational Hierarchies
OH
OHtypea
OHEtypea
OHEa∈ OHEtypea

A set of all Organisational Hierarchies within an enterprise with
OH = {OHtypea, OHtypeb, …, OHtypen}
One specific organisational hierarchy type within an enterprise, e.g. the
line organisation
A set of all hierarchical elements within OHtypea
An element of a certain organisational hierarchy type OHypea

Positions
POSITIONS
POSa∈ POSITIONS

The set of Positions within OH
A Position within an OHEa ∈ OHEtypea

Task Bundles
TB
TBa∈ TB

Set of all Task Bundles
A bundle of tasks serving to fulfil a certain business goal

Permission Bundles
PB
PBa∈ PB

Set of all Permission Bundles
A specific Permission Bundle serving to fulfil a certain business goal

Organisational and Functional Roles
ORG_Roles
FUN_Roles
ORG_Rolea ∈ ORG_Roles
FUN_Rolea ∈ FUN_Roles

Set of Organisational Roles
Set of Functional Roles
An Organisational Role defined to represent one Position
A Functional Role defined to represent one Task Bundle

3.2. Use Case Catalogue Definition
After the theoretical definition of input elements for role-checks we derived a comprehensive set of
input element-specific use cases that influence the existing role definitions (see Figure 2). The
elements are classified according to their respective layer of origin: Permissions and Permission
Bundles are representing the existing access rights and hence are directory-specific while the other
elements are related to operational and organisational structures within a company (OOS-specific).
For each element various operations are possible, representing one single use case. Regarding
Organisational Hierarchies, e.g., “new”, “delete”, “split”, and “merge” are possible operations.
Hierarchical elements can be created or deleted as a result of restructuring efforts within a
company. The splitting and merging operations can be seen as a combination of the previously
mentioned ones. In terms of Positions companies might e.g. define new or delete old ones. Splitting
an existing Position into two separate units can again be modelled as definition of two new
Positions, re-assigning the old Task Bundles appropriately, and the consecutive deletion of the old
Position. The same holds for the “merge” or “relocate” operation. Organisations might carry out
new Task Bundles, delete old ones, or relocate existing Task Bundles to a new Position. The “split”
and “merge” operations can again be seen as a special combination of the basic operations. Taking
a user-centric view one can easily recognise the various changes an Employee can go through when
working for a company. He can either change his Position or the assigned Task Bundles, or be
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relocated to other hierarchical elements. Directory-specific use cases, finally, are dealing with
Permission (Bundle) changes. Companies might install new resources, abandon old IT systems, or
update existing software. The various examples regarding the “merge”, “split”, and “relocate”
operations already have shown the interdependencies between single events. In practical settings it
is likely that they do not occur isolated but combined. We are thus now going to identify complex
use cases consisting of a number of the various events shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Theoretical use case catalogue

3.3. In-Depth Analysis of Selected Use Cases
In order to foster a clear differentiation and standardised usage we designed a three-layer scheme
describing every use case in terms of its structure, its impact on the role system, and possible
detection mechanisms. An analysis together with user partners from industry has shown the
applicability of this schema as a means of easing communication. We are thus using it during the
in-depth analysis of selected use cases in the following.
3.3.1. Selected Use Case 1: Employee Changes Hierarchical Element
Structure (Figure 3):
An employee EMPc is assigned to a new hierarchical element OHEi and Position POSi2 in the
organisation. Due to this fact his work pattern changes and consists of new Task Bundles TBc and
TBd. Previously he has been working in hierarchical element OHEj incorporating position POSj1 and
related Task Bundles TBe, TBf, and TBg.
Impact:
To enable correct execution of TBc and TBd according permissions are granted to EMPc. This means
that he needs to be assigned to a certain number of roles corresponding to POSi2, TBc, and TBd.
However, access right allocation is mostly done manually by IT administrators and only rarely on
basis of automated processes that ensure that the permissions requested are granted compliant with
current role system policies. Imagine the promotion of an employee that rapidly needs access rights
807

for his new daily work and thus requests them calling several IT administrators. This usually results
in a direct assignment of requested rights, probably on basis of the privileges of EMPb. Taking a
closer look at necessary de-provisioning tasks unused Organisational- and Functional Roles
corresponding to the old Position POSj1 and Task Bundles TBe, TBf, and TBg have to be revoked.
Usually no automatic de-provisioning processes are in place so that this duty is not carried out at all
or at most manually. Hence the employee is likely to accumulate a number of excessive rights
within the organisations’ IT systems, violating the principle of the least privilege [6].

Figure 3: Employee changing organisational hierarchy element

Detection and Actions:
The first step in this scenario is to detect all employees EMPi∈ EMPS which have been assigned to
a new hierarchical element. This can be done by analysing the according user attributes e.g. in the
global user directory. In a second step, Role Maintenance must on the one hand examine if these
employees have been assigned to the correct permissions and roles according to their new OHEi
assignment. In case of any incorrect assignments this situation has to be resolved together with
responsible executives. Role Maintenance has to check if old and thus unused access rights and role
memberships have been correctly revoked. Statistical analysis and the integration of policies that
e.g. define that a user is not allowed to be member of more than one Position in a certain
organisation hierarchy type OHtypea can be facilitated to address this problem.
3.3.2. Selected Use Case 2: New Hierarchical Element is Created
Structure (Figure 3):
A new hierarchical element OHEk is created within a company due to certain organisational
changes. It e.g. emerges from splitting an existing OHEl into two separate hierarchical elements.
Scientific publications in the business administration area and in the area of organisational
behaviour contain additional insight into reasons for change of hierarchical structures within an
organisation ([3], [13]). In this scenario the creation of a hierarchical element results in the definition
of a new position POSk1 and assignment of Task Bundles TBd, TBe ∈ TB. Employees are newly
hired (EMPnew) or move from existing hierarchical elements to the newly created one (EMPa).
Impact:
After the creation of a new hierarchical element appropriate Organisational- and Functional Roles
have to be defined. Role development has to be carried out for the new hierarchical element.
However, in real-life settings employees quickly need permissions in order to fulfil their workload.
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Imagine the newly created department OHEk in a large company. Two employees EMPa and
EMPnew assigned to the defined Position POSk1 need to work on a highly critical project as soon as
possible. In such a scenario administrators would likely assign permissions manually. This situation
is subverting the goals of the existing role system. A further disadvantage is that employees who
later on join this specific department, will also not be provided with the correct roles but rather gain
their permissions manually. Similar to the previous use case the employees that already worked
within the company in a different department still might have a large number of their old
permissions due to the lack of correct de-provisioning processes.

Figure 4: Creation of new hierarchical element

Detection and Actions:
To detect this use case and react appropriately any newly created or deleted hierarchical elements
have to be detected at first. This can be done by an analysis of available organisational charts, a list
of valid hierarchical elements, or user attributes regarding the assignment of employees to
hierarchical structures. Consecutively the permissions of employees working in the newly created
hierarchical elements have to be examined. Respective Functional- and Organisational Roles must
be implemented and the role catalogue extended accordingly if they are not in place yet. After the
creation of the various roles within the new hierarchical elements the permissions of employees
have to be correctly provisioned. Directly assigned permissions have to be revoked and
membership has to be granted using roles. Unused roles might have to be deleted.

4. checkROLE – A Tool for Automated Role Checking
As tool support for the automatic detection of the various use cases is mandatory we developed
checkROLE an open-source application that is able to detect events affecting the role definitions.
On this basis it provides responsible managers assistance in their decision process from Figure 1.
Input information from various user repositories at a certain point of time t is copied to the Role
Maintenance environment using a LDAP connector or a .csv-file import. Additionally, an image of
the currently valid role catalogue is extracted from the Role Management System. CheckROLE
provides interfaces to an Active Directory storing the role catalogue, synchronised identity
information, as well as access rights. Moreover a connector to other external Role Mining tools
gives us the ability to execute non-statistical analysis of user data.
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4.1. Detecting Use Cases in CheckROLE
Figure 5 presents the main interface of checkROLE. Besides the detection scenarios (Role

Maintenance) the Import to LDAP tab provides the ability to set up the data basis contained in the
underlying repository. To support additional Role Mining tasks, an Export to DB tab was
implemented providing export functionality of user and permission data. For real-life applicability
we narrowed down the theoretically defined use cases according to their outcome to nine so called
detection scenarios that checkROLE is able to identify. These detection scenarios occur in various
combinations, dependent on the underlying use cases from section 3:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

{EMPa, EMPb, …, EMPn} have directly assigned Permission Bundles PBa ∈ PB
{EMPa, EMPb, …, EMPn} have a set of wrong or unused Organisational Roles
{ORa, ORb, …, ORn} ∈ ORG_Roles
inconsistent assignment of Permission Bundle PBa ∈ PB to FUN_Rolea ∈ FUN_Roles
inconsistent assignment of Functional Role FUN_Rolea ∈ FUN_Roles to Organisational
Role ORG_Rolea ∈ ORG_Roles
detection of new Permission Bundle PBnew ∈ PB
detection of changes in Position definitions
detection of changes in Organisational Hierarchies

Figure 5: CheckROLE interface

4.2. Test Scenario
In order to demonstrate the application of checkROLE, we are going to present a short test scenario
in a small industrial company with about 10 departments, 45 employees and 15 different business
roles granting membership to about 50 different Active Directory groups (permissions). The
company has implemented busiROLE as role model. For the role-checks user information and the
existing role catalogue have been imported to the Role Maintenance environment using a LDAP
connection to the global Active Directory within the company. Applying the Check user moves and
the Check users OR functionality of checkROLE generates the output windows shown in Figure .
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Figure 6: CheckROLE test scenario output

The window on the left lists the employees that have changed their hierarchical element(s) and/or
Position since the last role-checking loop. Positions of employees are stored in the title attribute
within the Active Directory of the company. One can see that three users previously working in the
Development department have joined the MigrationTeam. Their title attribute has changed, e.g.
from Developer to ProjectLeader in case of employee PetBrau. Security policies prevent users to
have more than one Position and Organisational Role at a certain point of time. CheckROLE
identified that PetBrau is still connected to his old Organisational Role (OR_Developer) and that
his title attribute has a different entry not corresponding to the Organisational Role assigned.
Investigating the valid roles in the department MigrationTeam OR_ProjectLeader is suggested as
the correct role. This needs to be done on basis of cluster analysis of existing rights within the
respective department, closely interwoven with Role Development issues. The output window on
the right side of Figure reveals directly assigned permissions. Even though all the permissions
imported to the Role Maintenance environment have to be granted on basis of role membership,
checkROLE identified several direct user-permission assignments. Employee PetBrau is e.g. on the
one hand still able to access the various resources connected to his old Organisational Role. To
fulfil the tasks related to his new Position ProjectLeader he was on the other hand assigned to the
necessary permissions SW-Remedy-G, Project_Schedule, SW-RaD_Tools-G, and NET_Framework
directly. With this output responsible role managers now are able to take adequate measures to
resolve the found issues. This short scenario has shown that checkROLE is able to support strategic
Role Management and provide information that might not even have been identified at all.

5. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have seen that companies require support in ensuring the timeliness of the
implemented roles in their IT infrastructure. Several changes within an organisation might affect
the role definitions and require the role catalogue to be updated. This requires an automated
overview over possible changes to be integrated in a Role Maintenance solution. Up to now, to the
best of our knowledge, no assistance is provided by researchers in this area. Consequently we
defined a use case catalogue that acts as theoretical basis for role-checks. An in-depth analysis of
single use cases has revealed their structure, impact on the role definitions, and possible detection
mechanisms. We furthermore presented checkROLE a tool for automatic detection of various use
cases. It facilitates statistical analysis and data mining algorithms to compare a valid role catalogue
with the present situation within a company in order to identify discrepancies. A short test scenario
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has shown the applicability of checkROLE within a small company. For future work we are going
to add new functionalities for detecting combined use cases and migrate towards a process-oriented
role checking workflow. Up to now checkROLE only provides a simple text-based presentation of
results. For a seamless integration into future Role Maintenance and Role Development solutions it
needs to be extended in order to allow for an automatic correction of detected anomalies. Moreover
the text-based visualisation is very limited in terms of readability in more complex test scenarios.
We hence are implementing an adequate solution that presents the found results in a more
structured way allowing for interaction with the checkROLE users, i.e. the Role Maintenance team.
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